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ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
The recent decision of Keator v. Welch and Binmore,' handed
down by Justice Surveyer of the Superior Court of Quebec,
reached a conclusion squarely contrary to Louisiana jurisprudence. Following French and Belgian and prior Quebec doctrine
and jurisprudence, a right of recovery for alienation of affections
was maintained under the general tort article of the Quebec Civil
Code.2 As to the well-known Louisiana decision 8 upon the question, the Quebec Court said: "It is impossible to accept, under our
law, the ruling of the majority of the Court... of Louisiana...
the court having refused, in the said case, to look into the French
doctrine or jurisprudence on the subject .. "I
An examination of French doctrine and jurisprudence makes
it plain that, while the existence of a right to recover damages for
alienation of affections is disputed among some of the earlier writers, the more authoritative commentators and decisions are now
unanimous that recovery can be had by the injured spouse against
the accomplice in adultery.' This recovery is allowed under the
provisions of Article 1382 of the Code Napoleon 6-an article to
which the French writers give an application general enough to
1. 41 Rapports de Pratique de Quebec 414 (1938), decided by Justice
Edouard Fabre Surveyer. See "The Position of the Civil Law In Quebec,"
address delivered by Judge Surveyer at the dedication of Leche Hall (April
8, 1938), to appear in a forthcoming issue of this REvaiw.
2. Art. 1053, Quebec Civil Code: "Every person capable of discerning
right from wrong is responsible for the damage caused by his fault to
another, whether by positive act, Imprudence, neglect or want of skill."
3. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927).
4. Keator v. Welch and Binmore, 41 Rapports de Pratique do Quebec
414, 418 (1938).
5. 2 Fuzier-Herman, Rep. (1887) Vo. Adult~re, no 320: "Or, il est dvident
que l'poux, victime de l'adult~re, 6prouve un dommage; donc, il lut est d?2
une reparation pdcuniare, sauf aux Juges 4 veiller 4 ce que Z'exercice d'un
pareil droit no devienne pas, pour un mari ou pour une femme, la source
d'une spdculation scandaleuse."
3 Dalloz, Jur. Gdn. (1846) Vo. Adult6re, no 125, after referring with
disapproval to the doctrine advanced by a few French commentators to the
effect that there should be no recovery for alienation of affections, states:
"On ne sauraft nier Is prejudice immense que fait dprouver l'adultdre 4
Z'dpoux qui en est victims, et dont it d~truit le repos, brise les affections,
bouleverse l'existence entidre. On no saurait non plus d6couvrir de motif
sdrieux pour excepter un pareil prdjudice do la disposition si gundrale et
s juste de l'art. 1388 prdcit6."
See also 8 Demolombe, Trait6 des contrats (1882) no 515; Dalloz, Supp.
Jur. Gin. (1887) Va. Adultbre, nos 93 et seq.; Poitiers, 4 f~vrier 1837, Sirey,
1837.2.374; Cass. ch. crim., 22 septembre 1837, Sirey, 1838.1.331.
6. Art. 1382, French Civil Code: "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui
cause 4 autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivd,
d le rdparer." (Every act whatever of man, that causes damage to another,
obliges him by whose fault it happened, to repair it.)
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govern all social relations.' Damages are measured by the rule
established in their Article 1149,8 which permits a creditor to
recover ordinarily for the loss which he has sustained or the profit
of which he has been deprived. However, only the "material and
moral damages proved" may be recovered. 9
In Louisiana, apparently divergent trends in policy exist
with regard to two closely related actions: 10 that for breach of
marriage promise, and that for alienation of affections. In the
former situation, recovery has been reluctantly allowed11 because
Article 1934 (par. 3) of the Civil Code of 1870 specifically provides damages for breach of the marriage promise. In the case of
the action for alienation of affections, however, no express provision of law stood in the way and the courts have been able to circumvent the general tort provisions of Article 2315.
When the Monteleone case came before Judge Cage of the
Civil District Court of Orleans Parish, he reached the conclusion
that in Louisiana the only action for adultery is a suit for divorce,
and he expressed the opinion that the possibility of Article 2315
being sufficiently comprehensive to grant relief to the injured
spouse in an alienation case was worthy of only the slightest con7. 8 Demolombe, op. cit. supra note 5, no 516: "Le principe de la responsabilitd civile ddictd par los articles 1382-1383, est, dison-nous, de la gdndralitd
la plus absolue; il gouverne toutes les relations socialesl
"Il n'y a pas de profession, depuis los plus humbles jusqu'aux plus dlevdes
industrielles ou libdrales; il n'y a pas d'art, de condition, d'8tat, pour lesquels
on puisse rdclamer l'irresponsabilitddes ddlits ou des quasi-ddlits qui pourratent y etre commis.
"C'est la consdquence du texte mime de la lot, qui n'admet ni distinction
ni exception, et du principe essential d'dquitd, sur lequel ce texte repose."
8. Art. 1149, French Civil Code: "Los dommages et intdrdts dus au crdancier sont, en gdndral, de la porte qu'il a faite et du gain dont il a 6td
privd, sauf los exceptions et modifications ci-aprds." (The damages due to
the creditor are, in general, for the loss which he has suffered and for the
profit of which he has been deprived, saving the following exceptions and
modifications.)
9. Dalloz, Supp. Jur. G~n. (1887) Vo. Adult~re, no 94.
10. It is interesting to note that, while there Is an action for alienation
of affections in most other civil law jurisdictions, the action for the breach
of the marriage promise is absent. Daggett, The Action for Breach of the
Marriage Promise, Legal Essays on Family Law (1935) 39 et seq.
11. Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316 (1850); Smith v. Braun, 37 La.
Ann. 225 (1885). In the Morgan case (at p. 323) the court said: "In conclusion, we may take occasion to observe, that this is the first time we or our
predecessors have been called upon to consider an action of this kind. It is
a fact creditable to our people; and we hope that such actions may not
become frequent. While we are bound, under our jurisprudence and Code, to
recognize the right of action, we are constrained to say that a female of
refined sensibility could scarcely bring herself to such a suit; and that the
appeals which are usually made to juries in such cases, on the score of the
wounded affections of the woman, can have little foundation in truth. Such
suits are not infrequently the mere instruments of extortion; courts and

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

sideration. 12 On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court through
Chief Justice O'Niell as its organ, listed "several very obvious
reasons why none of the great lawyers who have graced Louisiana's bar has ever heretofore thought that an action for damages
for alienation of a wife's affections would be consonant with the
system of law peculiar to Louisiana.'" The reasons listed, in effect, are: (1) that damages for alienation of affections are essentially punitive or exemplary damages-a type of damages not
authorized in civil cases in Louisiana; 14 (2) that there is no positive law to be found on the subject in Louisiana; (3) that the law
undertakes only to control and regulate human conduct-not
human nature; (4) that the law considers marriage in no other
view than as a civil contract and that there is no right of action
for damages ex delicto against one who induces another to violate
his or her contract with a third person; (5) that a wife is not one
of her husband's chattels and that services and affections are not
his property, for a man can have no kind of property in the company of one who is his equal in the eyes of the law; (6) that the
best way to suppress conduct leading to alienation of affections
would be by means of a penal statute; (7) that a law allowing
compensation for such a wrong would be revolting to many people; (8) that such a law would tend to encourage blackmail; (9)
that since Article 2294 of the Civil Code of 182515 (present Article
2315) was an abbreviation of the corresponding article of the
Civil Code of 180816 which merely restated a fundamental principle of Roman law, Article 2315 must be subjected to the same
construction and limitations which had been put upon similar
provisions in the jurisprudence of Rome and Spain; and, since it
was certain that under Roman and Spanish laws there was no
juries should, therefore, cautiously restrict relief to cases of real injustice."
12. Moulin v. Monteleone, Supreme Court Docket No. 28466, p. 9:
... while Article 2315 declares that every act of man which causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it occurred to repair it, there are any
number of acts which cause damage which do not fall within the purview of
this article because they are damnum absque injuria.
"In my opinion, the law of Louisiana never has given such an action as
this brought, and so far as I am concerned personally, I hope It never will."
13. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 172, 115 So. 447, 448 (1927).
14. Cf. Note, infra p. 226.
15. Art. 2294, La. Civil Code of 1825: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another, obliges him, by whose fault it happened, to
repair it."
16. La. Civil Code of 1808, p. 320, 3.4.16: "Every act whatever of man,
that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened, to
repair it, even though the fault be not of the nature of those which expose
to the penalties of simple or correctional police."
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right of action for alienation of affections," Louisiana courts must
likewise refuse to grant a right of action.
This last argument is the only position taken by Chief Justice
O'Niell which seems open to question. In truth, the origin of
Article 2315 can not be fixed with certainty; but, it is, as Chief
Justice O'Niell points out in his opinion,"' an exact translation of
the tort article of the Code Napoleon. 19 Thus, it would seem that
our present article might possibly have been taken from the Code
Napoleon and it may not be a mere abbreviation of the corresponding article of the Civil Code of 1808. Furthermore, there is
reason to believe that the latter article itself was taken directly
from a French source rather than from Roman or Spanish law.
This position is supported by reference to the projet of the Code
Napoleon which contains the following article:
"Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause A autrui un dommage, oblige celui, par la faute duquel il est arrive, A le r6parer, encore que la faute ne soit point de la nature de celles
qui exposent A des peines de police simple ou correction20
n elle.,
The language used in the French text of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1808 conforms exactly with this text, varying only in the omission of the words "de l'homme" at the beginning of the article,
and even this slight omission is not made in the English version
which reads: "Every act whatever of man.. ." This is almost uncontrovertible argument that the article of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808 was taken from the projet of the French Civil Code,
and since in addition the provision in the Louisiana Civil Code of
1825 reproduces the article which was finally adopted in the Code
Napoleon, it would seem that French authorities might very well
have been followed had the Louisiana court been of the opinion
2
that by so doing public policy would be served best. '
17. The authority cited by Chief Justice O'Niell in support of this statement is Las Siete Partidas, 7.9.5 (2 Moreau Lislet and Carleton's Transl.
(1820) 1176).
The absence of an action for alienation of affections in Roman law must
have been the necessary consequence of the complete freedom of divorce in
later Roman law. Cf. Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law
(1936) 29.
18. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 180, 115 So. 447, 451 (1927).
19. Art. 1382, French Civil Code.
20. Projet de la Commission du Gouvernement, an VIII (1800) Bk. III,
tit. III, Art. 16. (Arts. 17 and 18, are likewise identical with the two subsequent articles in the La. Civil Code of 1808).
21. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927) in effect overruled Hennessey v. Wahlig, 155 La. 465, 99 So. 405 (1924). The court in Moulin
v. Monteleone tried to distinguish the two cases by saying that Hennessey v.
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The proper approach in examining the problem presented by
alienation of affections cases, however, should not only be an
examination into historical background but should more particularly be an inquiry into its present desirability. This inquiry involves a consideration of the social functions which the action
performs and the objections which may be made to it.
The action for alienation of affections has been consistently
allowed in England and in most of the United States. 2 At common law a husband's right of action for damages for alienation of
a wife's affections is, according to Blackstone, based in some
measure upon the idea that the wife is the inferior of the husband and that her companionship, services and affections are his
property, for the loss of which, by wrongful inducement on the
28
part of another man, the husband ought to be compensated.
Conversely, at common law, the wife can have no such right of
action for alienation of the affections of her husband. Chief Justice O'Niell points out the fallacy of retaining the action if there
can be found no better basis for its continued existence than the
obsolete notion of the wife being the husband's chattel:
"It is just as true that a man can have no kind of property
in the company, care or assistance of one who is, in every
sense, his equal in the eyes of the law. It is not the wife's
inferiority, but her want of superiority, that denies her the
right of action, accorded the husband at common law, to recover damages for alienation of the affections of the other
spouse. In Louisiana, the wife, by virtue of several recent
emancipation laws, has practically every prerogative that the
2
husband has." '

The argument that the action for alienation should not be based
upon legal principles "permeated with the ideas which mark their
Wahlig was not a suit for damages for alienation of affections at all but

that the cause of action was slander. However, the following quotation from
the Hennessey case shows that the court in Moulin v. Monteleone was hardly
justified in so distinguishing the two cases: " . . . The husband is legally
entitled to the possession and society of his wife, and to her aid and assistance, as long as he complies with the obligations arising from the contract
of marriage.
"Any invasion of such marital rights, whether by the father or mother
of the wife, or by a third person, without just or reasonable cause, necessarily
constitutes an act resulting in damages to him, and imposes upon the trespasser, by whose fault it happened, the obligation of repairing the injury.
R.C.C. 2315." (155 La. at 468, 99 So. at 406)
22. 13 R.C.L. 1458 and cases there cited.
23. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Sharswood's
ed. 1860) 143.
24. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 177, 115 So. 447, 450 (1927).
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origin in a rough and uncultivated society" 25 appears unanswerable.
In support of retaining the action for alienation of affections,
the position is often taken in some common law jurisdictions that
its abolition would lead to an increase in lawlessness. The remedy of damages is said to serve certain broad social purposes 2 6the preservation of family solidarity, 27 the protection of the interest of the public in security from intentional and unjustifiable
interference by an outsider with the stability of the home, and
the prevention of evils resulting from sexual promiscuity. It is
pointed out that husband and wife reciprocally have a legal right
to the affections, services and consortium of each other,2 8 and

those who favor the action contend that any alienation of these
affections, accompanied by a loss of consortium and services, constitutes a violation of that legal right. They further argue that if
persons are denied access to the courts, they will take matters
into their own hands with consequent violence and an increased
disrespect for the law. Still no apparent hardship seems to have
developed as a result of Louisiana's refusal to grant the action.
The injured spouse always has the privilege of obtaining a divorce. 29 Furthermore, the action for alienation-assuming that it
is an honest action by a plaintiff actually injured-is seldom
brought until all hope of preserving the marriage is gone. Instead
of preserving the family and protecting the home, it only adds to
the antagonism which exists between the two spouses and spreads
publicity deleterious to the reputations of all parties concerned.
It might be urged that newspaper publicity and journalistic
scandal have caused the public to ignore the benefits of the
action, and that isolated cases of abuse have been given the appearance of universality. On the other hand, it might be claimed
that the worthy and reasonable cases have been ignored by the
newspapers. However, the type of people who are really harmed
by the conduct at which the action is directed are those who
25. 1 Cooley, Torts (3 ed. 1906) 465, quoted in Moulin v. Monteleone, 165
La. 169, 178, 115 So. 447, 450 (1927).
26. Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections (1934) 82 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 472.
27. Id. at 505-506.
28. Art. 119, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The husband and wife owe to each
other mutually, fidelity, support and assistance." Cf. Leon Green, Relational
Interests (1934) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 460, 468, that an action for alienation of affections is based on the damage done to a "relational interest."
29. Arts. 138, 139, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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refuse to accept money as a compensation for their injury or to
expose themselves to scandal and publicity, and therefore it
would be useless to search court records for "deserving cases."
Even if it should be granted for the sake of argument that
the alleged injuries-loss of a spouse's love and society, the destruction of home and happiness, and the suffering endured in the
anguish and distress of mind-do justify substantial damages,
there may still be very serious objections to the action which will
more than balance the advantages derived from it. One objection
to the action is that the uncertain basis for damages often makes
them largely punitive. The types of damage that result are not
capable of precise measurement. As a result a wide range of
discretion is left to the jury. Thus it is only natural that damages
are indefinite and usually excessive, bearing little, if any, relation
to the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff. Since the jury is
entitled to take into consideration many indefinite and purely
psychological injuries, the moral indignation and emotional sympathy of the jury is often expressed by granting recovery to an
"outraged" plaintiff against a "dishonorable" defendant
for the
plaintiff's mental suffering and disgrace. In such cases serious
injustice to the defendant may very well result.
However, any argument against the action based on possible
injustice to the defendant may lose some of its force when it is
remembered that such a defendant is not entitled to overmuch
sympathy. The contention is advanced that, if he is to be held at
all, it must be shown that he intentionally interfered with the
marital relations of another person, that is, he deliberately attempted to break up a home and in a measure at least succeeded;
and the conclusion is reached that, should the uncertain basis for
damages frighten some persons who would otherwise commit
such offenses, the action has served its purpose. However, this
position both presupposes the guilt of the defendant and leaves
out of account the factor of blackmail. Perhaps the greatest single
evil attributed to the action is that it is rapidly becoming nothing
more than a vehicle of extortion. Many suits are brought in the
hope of extorting out-of-court settlements or of recovering exorbitant damages for entirely fictitious injuries. The law of extortion or blackmail is ineffectual to remedy the evil of unfounded
actions and extra-judicial settlements, since the dread of publicity prevents the issue from ever being raised. As a result of
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the large number of extortion cases, several states have abolished
the action for alienation of affections.80
But does the fact that the action is an instrument of blackmail and extortion justify its complete abolition? Such abuses are
connected with a large number of remedies afforded in other
fields of litigation, especially in regard to actions for divorce,
personal injuries and insurance recoveries. The same objections
which are made to the action for alienation might likewise be
applied to these actions. The answer to this argument is manifest. Admitting that actions for divorce, personal injuries and
insurance recoveries have been gravely abused and need reforming, the continued existence of an action for alienation of affections, if it might otherwise be desirably abolished, is not thereby
excused.
The pain accorded innocent members of the families of the
parties by the resultant notoriety, the inadequacy of damages as a
remedy for injuries of this kind, the ineffectiveness of the action
from a preventive viewpoint, 1 and the publicity which results
from such an action furnish further objections. All in all, there
can be slight doubt that the interests which the action seeks to
protect are of less importance than the interests upon which it
has a harmful effect.
With regard to the decision reached in Moulin v. Monteleone,
another very potent argument that could be advanced by one in
favor of allowing an action for alienation is that the Louisiana
Supreme Court in reality usurped the function of the legislature
when it deprived all persons of their remedy. To decide contrary
to the apparently inclusive language of Article 2315 of the La.
Civil Code of 1870 and the interpretations placed upon similar
provisions in the French law by the French jurisprudence and
the more authoritative commentators, might very well seem to be
unjustifiable in view of the fact that the public policy involved
should be the subject of legislative determination. It is submitted, however, that in the light of the dictates of public policy
30. Comment, (1936) 30 Ill. L. Rev. 764, n. 1 lists the various state
statutes abolishing "heart-balm" actions and enumerates the states in which
bills were reported by the newspapers to have been introduced.
31. The proponents of legislative abolition contend that injunctive or
criminal sanctions are more appropriate to accomplish the purposes which
the action for alienation is supposed to serve and that in any event the
damage remedy has proved its ineffectiveness as an inhibiting instrumentality. Feinsinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry,
Alienation of Affections, and Related Actions (1935) 10 Wis. L. Rev. 417, 418.
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and the recent trend toward abolishing the action as evidenced in
legislation on the subject in a number of the states, the Louisiana
Court was justified in the conclusion reached. The court rightfully
felt that the public good would not be advanced by allowing
such an action. Therefore, instead of looking to the French authorities, it asserted its privilege of deducing the meaning of Article 2315 of the Civil Code from the "spirit" which pervades the
Code. Furthermore, it is suggested that the rule of decision in the
Quebec case of Keator v. Welch and Binmore is an unfortunate
one. The case was decided on the basis of French and Belgian authorities and in conformity with Quebec jurisprudence; there was
no discussion of public policy.
In conclusion, even admitting the historical basis of Moulin
v. Monteleone to be doubtful, it is submitted that the court was
entirely justified in its refusal to fasten upon Louisiana the evils
which it so clearly saw would result from the action for alienation of affections.

F. HODGE

O'NEAL.

